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New Capabilities Introduced
Several other capabilities had to be introduced in addition to the existing
POSIX and Linux specific capabilities to enable correct
functioning of LinSec:
- CAP_PROC_PROTECTED: refer to Subsection 4.2.11.
- CAP_PROC_UNKILLABLE: refer to Subsection 4.2.11.
- CAP_PROC_GOD: refer to Subsection 4.2.11.
- CAP_PROC_HIDDEN: refer to Subsection 4.2.11.
- CAP_NET_HIDDEN: refer to Subsection 4.2.11.
- CAP_SYS_BOOTTIME: refer to Subsection 4.2.10.
- CAP_MOD_CAP: a process that has this capability in its effective set is
allowed to modify its own permitted and effective capability sets. This feature
is necessary for the correct operation of userspace LinSec
administrative tools4.7.
- CAP_ACD_OVERRIDE: a process with this capability in its effective
capability set bypasses LinSec file system access domain control
mechanisms (Section 4.3). This feature is necessary for the correct
operation of userspace LinSec administrative tools.
- CAP_LINSEC_ADMIN: a process with this capability in its effective
capability set can configure LinSec mandatory security policy (Section
4.5).
Footnotes
- ... tools4.7
- To perform LinSec administrative tasks,
a process needs to have CAP_LINSEC_ADMIN capability in its effective
capability set. As static allocation of the capability to any program is
regarded risky (due to eg. buffer overflow attacks on the capability model
itself), the process is allowed to modify its capability sets, after the user
that invoked it has provided correct administrative password.
Next: LD_PRELOAD Attack
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